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POST-MITE: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
STATE TAKEOVER ACTS
In response to an increasing use of cash tender offers1 to acquire corporate control and the absence of adequate investor protection during
takeovers, Congress and a majority of state legislatures have enacted
legislation regulating takeover bids.' Although the Securities Act of 1933
('33 Act)' and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act)4 protected
investors by requiring issuers to make full disclosures to investors concerning a public offering or public trading of securities,5 investors received
only minimal protections during tender offers.' In 1968 Congress amended

' See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1976) (Williams Act applies to tender offers for securities
registered on national securities exchange). Although Congress enacted the Williams Act
to regulate tender offers, Congress did not define the term "tender offer". See Note, The
Elusive Definition of a Tender Offer, 7 J. CORP. L. 503, 503 (1982). Traditionally, "tender offer" has meant a public invitation to a corporation's shareholders to sell the corporation's
securities to a tender offeror at a price above the securities' market price. See Note, The
DevelopingMeaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1984, 86 HARV.
L. REv. 1250, 1251 (1973). In 1979, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed
a comprehensive definition of "tender offer." See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 16385 (Nov. 29, 1979), reprintedin [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
83,374, at 82,600. Under the SEC's proposed definition, a transaction qualifies as a tender
offer if either of two test are met. See id. at 82,603-05. A program to acquire a corporation's
securities is a tender offer if one or more offers to purchase more than 5% of a single
class of the corporation's securities is made to more than ten shareholders during any 45
day period. See id. at 82,603. Alternatively, an attempt to purchase securities of a single
class is a tender offer if the offer exceeds the securities' market price by the greater of
two dollars or five percent of the market price and is widely disseminated with no opportunity to negotiate the offered price or terms. See id. at 82,604-05; see also ALI FED. SEC.
CODE § 299.68 (1978) (tender offer is offer to buy securities directed to more than thirty-five
persons). See generally Korval, Defining Tender Offers: Resolving a Decade of Dilemma, 13
SEC. L. REv. 549 (1981); Note, What is a Tender Offer?, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 908 (1980).
2 See S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprintedin 1968 CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2811, 2812 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT] (increases in use of tender offers leave investors unprotected because existing law does not require adequate disclosure of offeror's
intent); E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 65 n.3 (1973)'
(number of tender offers increased from 8 in 1960 to 107 in 1966); see also 15 U.S.C. §5
78m(d)(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (federal legislation responding to increased use
of tender offers); infra note 21 (state legislative response to increased use of tender offers).
3 15 U.S.C. § 77a-bbb (1976).
Id. § 78a-jj.
See id. % 77f, 77j (disclosure requirements for issuance of securities); id. S 781 (information required for registration of securities traded on national securities exchanges);
see also Dean, Twenty-Five Years ofFederal SecuritiesRegulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 59 COLUm. L. REV. 697, 698-702 (1959) (theory of Securities Act of 1933
and Securities Exchange Act of' 1934).
'See generally Fleischer & Mundheim, CorporateAcquisition By Tender Offer, 115 U.
PA. L. REv. 317, 328-53 (1967) (protection of investors during tender offers prior to Williams
Act). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act) treated a cash tender offer to acquire
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1228

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:1227

the '34 Act by enacting the Williams Act7 to regulate tender offers for
publicly held securities The Williams Act is consistent with the '33 and
'34 Acts' philosophy of protecting investors through full disclosure.9 The
Williams Act's disclosure requirements protect investors10 by requiring

control of a corporation in the same manner as an offer to purchase a single share of the
corporation's stock. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(b) (1976) ('34 Act applies to transactions in securities
conducted over the counter and on securities exchanges). The federal securities regulations
enacted prior to the Williams Act, however, regulate two other types of transactions used
to acquire corporate control. See id. S 77e(c) (federal regulation of exchange offers); id. S
78n(a)-(c) (federal regulation of proxy solicitation). First, the Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act)
requires a corporation that intends to acquire control of another corporation with a stockfor-stock exchange to provide the sought after corporation's shareholders with a prospectus explaining the terms of the offer, stating the identity of the purchaser, and explaining
the purchaser's plans for the corporation. Id. S 77j. Second, the '34 Act requires shareholders
attempting to acquire control of a corporation through a proxy contest to inform other
shareholders of the identity of the participants, the participants shareholdings, and the
date the participant acquired the shares. Id. S 78n(a)-(c).
' Williams Act, Pub. L. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
5 78m(d(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). In 1965, Senator Williams of New Jersey submitted to the Senate a bill that discouraged takeover bids by increasing incumbent management's ability to defeat tender offers. See S. 2731, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). Senator Williams
sought to discourage takeovers because of the business community's perception of tender
offerors as "corporate raiders" more interested in acquiring quick profits by reselling an
acquired corporation's assets than in the efficient operation of acquired companies. See 113
CONG. REc. 28,257-58 (1965) (remarks of Sen. Williams) (corporate raiders have reduced "proud
old companies to corporate shells"). The business community, however, gradually accepted
the use of tender offers as a method of changing corporate control. See Note, Commerce
Clause Limitations upon State Regulation of Tender Offers, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1133, 1137-39
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Commerce ClauseLimitations] (factors other than acquiring quick
profits account for increased use of tender offers). To reflect the business community's acceptance of the legitimacy of tender offers, Senator Williams submitted a second bill that
Congress eventually enacted as the Williams Act. See S. 510, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967),
113 CONG. REC. 854 (1967) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. SS 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(0 (1976 & Supp.
V 1981)). Congress recognized that federal regulation of tender offers should not discourage
takeover bids because some tender offers promote society's best interest by providing a
method for removal of entrenched inefficient management. See SENATE REPORT, supranote
2, at 3 (takeovers serve useful purpose).
' 15 U.S.C. S 78n(d) (1976). The increasing use of tender offers prior to the enactment
of the Williams Act removed a substantial number of contests for corporate control from
the reach of existing federal disclosure requirements. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S.
1, 22 (1977); see ARANOW & EINHORN, supra note 2, at 65 n.3 (use of tender offers to acquire
corporate control have increased). Congress enacted the Williams Act to "close the gap"
between the investor protections Congress provided shareholders during tender offers and
the investor protections Congress provided investors during proxy contests and stock for
stock transactions to acquire corporate control. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 2-4; see supra
note 6 (federal regulation of transactions to acquire corporate control before Williams Act).
I See Sowards & Mofsky, CorporateTake-Over Bids: Gap in FederalSecuritiesRegulation, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 499, 507 (1967) (basic philosophy of federal securities regulation
is to protect investors by requiring full and fair disclosures); supra note 5 and accompanying text (disclosure provisions of '33 and '34 Acts).
1 See Edgar v. Mite Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629, 2636 (1982) (plurality opinion) (Congress
enacted Williams Act to protect investors, Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977)
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a tender offeror to disclose to a target corporation's shareholders information pertinent to a shareholder's informed evaluation of a takeover bid.'1
Additionally, the Williams Act and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations, enacted pursuant to the Williams Act, 2 regulate
the procedures of a tender offer and provide investors substantive
protections. 3
(sole purpose of Williams Act is investor protection); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422
U.S. 49, 58 (1975) (Congress intended to provide adequate protection to shareholders confronted with tender offers); SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 3-4 (Williams Act enacted for
benefit of investors).
"' See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1976) (tender offeror must disclose pertinent information
concurrently with commencement of offer). The disclosure provisions of the Williams Act
ensure that an investor confronted with a tender offer will have adequate information about
the offeror's qualifications and intentions to make an intelligent investment decision. See
Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975) (purpose of Williams Act is to enable
investors to make informed investment decisions); SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 2-4
(Williams Act enables shareholders to intelligently evaluate takeover bids). See generally
E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE
CONTROL 56-103 (1977) (disclosure requirements of Williams Act).
The William Act's disclosure requirements apply to a person or corporation that will
acquire by tender offer five percent or more of any class of a registered company's equity
securities. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1976). The Williams Act requires a tender offeror to file
a schedule 14D-1 disclosure statement concurrently with the commencement of the takeover
bid. Id.; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1982) (schedule 14D-1 disclosure statement); see also
infra note 127 and accompanying text (commencement of tender offers). The tender offeror
files the schedule 14D-1 statement with the SEC and transmits the disclosure statement's
contents to the target corporation and to the target corporation's shareholders. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(d)(1) (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3 (1982). The Williams Act requires that the schedule
14D-1 statement disclose the bidder's identity, the source and amount of funds the bidder
will use to purchase the target corporation's securities, and the extent of the bidder's prior
holdings in the target company. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(1), 78n(d)(1) (1976). If the tender
offeror intends to acquire control of the target company, the disclosure statement must
indicate whether the offeror intends to liquidate the target company, merge the target
corporation with another company, or make major changes in the acquired company's internal structure. See id. § 78m(d)(1)(C). The SEC also requires an offeror to disclose the
purpose of the tender offer, the offeror's financial condition, and the applicability of any
antitrust laws. See 17 C.F.R. S 240.14d-100 (1976).
" See 15 U.S.C. SS 78m(d}{1), 78n(d)(1) (1976) (SEC authorization to enact rules and regulations to supplement Williams Act); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d, .14d (1982) (SEC regulations enacted
pursuant to Williams Act).
13 See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d), (e) (1976) (Williams Act regulations of tender offer procedure);
17 C.F.R. 5 240.14d (1982) (SEC regulations of tender offer procedures). The substantive
provisions of the Williams Act and the SEC regulations protect shareholders by regulating
withdrawals of tendered shares, pro rata purchases, increases in the purchase price, and
the making of false and misleading statements. See 15 U.S.C. S 78n(d(e) (1976); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14d (1982). The Williams Act as supplemented by the SEC regulations permits a
shareholder to withdraw tendered shares anytime within 15 days of the commencement
of the tender offer, or if the offeror has not purchased the tendered shares, anytime after
60 days of the offer's commencement. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1976); 17 C.F.R. S 240.14d-7
(1982) (extends withdrawal period from 7 to 15 days). If the number of securities shareholders
tender during the first ten days of a tender offer exceed the number of shares the purchaser intends to acquire, the Williams Act requires the offeror to purchase the tendered
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To protect investors adequately during corporate takeovers, Congress
enacted a specific regulatory scheme. 4 Congress adopted a "market
approach" 5 to tender offers, whereby a target corporation's shareholders
determine the success or failure of a takeover bid after examining all the
pertinent information concerning the offer. 6 Under the market approach,
a target company's shareholders determine a takeover bid's success or
failure by tendering or refusing to tender securities of the target corporation to the offeror. 17 To ensure that investors have an adequate opshares on a pro rata basis according to the number of shares tendered by each shareholder.
See 15 U.S.C. S 78n(d)(6) (1976) (Williams Act pro rata purchasing provision); see also 17 C.F.R.
S 240.14d-8 (1982) (requirements for extending ten day period). If before the expiration of
a tender offer the purchaser increases the price the purchaser is offering for the target
corporation's securities, the Williams Act requires the purchaser to pay the higher price
for the shares already tendered. See 15 U.S.C. S 78n(d)(7) (1976). The Williams Act also prohibits the making of fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative statements concerning a tender
offer. See 15 U.S.C. S 78n(e) (1976) (Williams Act general antifraud provision).
4 See Edgard v. Mite Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629,2635-37 (1982) (plurality opinion) (Williams
Act established regulatory scheme to protect investors); Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell,
577 F.2d 1256, 1276 (5th Cir. 1978) (Congress adopted distinct regulatory scheme to protect
investors), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173
(1979); 15 U.S.C. SS 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (Williams Act).
'- See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1276 (5th Cir. 1978) (Congress
adopted "market approach" to investor protection), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Leroy
v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979). The '"market approach" is a regulatory scheme
that ensures that the shareholders of a target corporation determine the merits of a takeover
bid. See Edgar v. Mite Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629, 2639 (1982) (plurality opinion) (Congress intended investors to make own investment decisions); Kidwell, 577 F2d at 1276 (Congress
intended investors to evaluate tender offers); SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 3 (Williams
Act insures that investors make investment decisions). Several state legislatures have adopted
a "benevolent bureaucracy" approach to investor protection that permits a state official
to prevent a tender offeror from presenting an offer to a target corporation's shareholders
if the state official determines that the terms of the offer are inequitable. See infra note
23 and accompanying text (state hearing requirements).
," See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1276 (5th Cir. 1978) (Williams
Act enables investors to make informed investment decisions), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979). Congress intended to protect
the interests of investors by providing investors with the information necessary to an informed decision on whether to hold, sell, or tender the corporation's securities. See SENATE
REPORT, supranote 2, at 2 (shareholder cannot make informed decision without information
about offeror and offeror's plans); see also supra note 10 (Congress intended to protect interests of investors). The Williams Act provides shareholders an opportunity to make an
intelligent evaluation of a tender offer by allowing both the offeror and the target company's management to present arguments concerning the merits of the offer. Kidwell, 577
F.2d at 1276; see SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 3 (Williams Act gives offeror and management equal opportunity to present arguments). The target corporation's shareholders then
decide whether to tender the corporation's securities to the tender offeror. See Mite Corp.
v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 494 (7th Cir. 1980) (Congress intended investors to have unfettered
choice), affd Edgar v. Mite Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982). But see Note, Cash Tender Offers,
83 HARV. L. REV. 377, 383 (1969) (offering price is shareholder's primary consideration when
determining whether to tender).
17 See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1276 (5th Cir. 1978) (Congress
intended shareholders to decide outcome of tender offers), rev'd on other grounds sub norn.
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portunity to evaluate takeover bids, Congress enacted a scheme of
regulatory neutrality that provided neither a target corporation's management nor the bidder with any undue advantage."' Congress avoided tipping the regulatory balance in favor of a target corporation's management because any undue advantage could increase management's ability
to defeat a tender offer thereby depriving investors of the opportunity
to evaluate the takeover bid.19
Responding to a concern that the Williams Act does not adequately
protect the interests of local shareholders,' thirty-eight state legislatures
Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979). But see infra note 19 (defensive tactics
management may use to defeat tender offer without relying on favorable investment decision of shareholders).
" See Edgar v. Mite Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629, 2636 (1983) (plurality opinion) (regulatory
neutrality enhances shareholders' ability to make informed investment decisions); Rondeau
v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975) (Congress avoided enhancing management's
ability to defeat takeover bids); Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1277 (5th
Cir. 1978) (neutrality is "cornerstone" to Williams Act's objective of investor protection),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp, 443 U.S. 173 (1979); SENATE
REPORT, supranote 2, at 3 (Williams Act avoids tipping balance of regulation in favor of either
management or offeror).
19 Edgar v. Mite Corp., 102 S.Ct. 2629, 2636 (1982) (plurality opinion) (Congress adopted
policy of neutrality because tender offers serve useful purpose that could be upset by favoring
management or offeror); see also supranote 7 (tender offers serve useful purpose by removing inefficient management). A successful takeover bidder may implement substantial changes
in a target company's management, policy, or operations that are not in the target corporation's best interest. See ARANOW & EINHORN, supra note 2, at 217-22 (managemient's obligation to defend against a takeover that is not in best interest of company); Comment, Antitakeover Maneuvers:Developments in Defense Tactics and TargetActions for Injunctive Relief,
35 Sw. L.J. 617,618 (1981) [hereinafter cited asAntitakeoverManuevers](successful takeover
may substantially change target corporation). Management may decide to initiate defensive tactics to fight a takeover bid that is not in the corporation's best interest. See ARANOW
& EINHORN, supra note 2, at 217-76 (defensive tactics).
Some of the defensive tactics a target corporation might adopt to attempt to defeat
a takeover bid are repurchasing the corporation's securities, defensive mergers, declaration of cash dividends, initiations of a counter offer to acquire control of the tender offeror,
and litigation. Id.; Antitakeover Maneuvers, supra,at 234-76. Additionally, a commonly used
defensive tactic to discourage tender offers is reincorporation in a state that has a strong
antitakeover statute. AntitakeoverManuevers,supra at 625. But see infra notes 151-71 and
accompanying text (state takeover statutes are unconstitutional). Defensive tactics that delay
the commencement or consummation of tender offers increase incumbent management's
chances of defeating a takeover bid without relying on a favorable investment decision
by the shareholders. See Langevoort, State Tender Offer Legislation:Interests,Effects, and
PoliticalCompetency, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 213,238 (1977) (time is management's most potent
weapon); Commerce Clause Limitations, supra note 7, at 1134-36 (delay provides management more time to contest tender offers); see also Austin, Tender Offer Update: 1978-1979,
15 MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Summer 1980, at 16-19 (statistical study showing that uncontested
tender offers are more successful than contested tender offers, infra note 24 and accompanying text (state takeover statutes potentially may delay commencement or consumation
of tender offers).
I See Note, The Illinois Business Take-OverAct: An Examinationof Constitutionaland
Policy Considerations,1981 U. ILLL. REv. 521,521-23 (1981) (state takeover statutes enacted
to increase shareholder protections); Note, Securities Law and the Constitution"State Tender
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have enacted legislation regulating takeover bids.' A majority of state
takeover statutes follow the congressional philosophy of investor protection by requiring full and fair disclosure.2 The state statutes, however,
Offer Statutes Reconsidered, 88 YALE L.J. 510, 515 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Tender Offer
Statutes Reconsidered] (purpose of state statutes is to provide shareholder protection); see
also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121'/2, S§ 135.51 to .70 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983) (purpose of Illinois Act is to protect local shareholders). Although the stated objective of state takeover
statutes is to supplement the Williams Act investor protection provisions, most commentators who have examined the legislative intentions behind the state statutes have concluded that the state legislatures intended to protect local business from out-of-state tender
offerors. See Aranow & Einhorn, State Securities Regulation of Tender Offers, 46 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 767,768 (1971) [hereinafter cited as State Securities Regulation](some state legislatures
have enacted legislation that protects interest of issuer rather than interests of investors);
Langevoort, supra note 19, at 240 (state takeover statutes serve interests of entrenched
incumbent management); Moylan, State Regulation of Tender Offers, 58 MARQ. L. REv. 687,
690 (1975) (state legislatures enacted takeover statutes for fear of effects of takeovers on
local economy); Wilner & Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their Constitutionality, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 18 (1976) (state legislatures sought to protect local
managements from hostile takeover bids). The better view, however, is that a variety of
considerations, including investor protection and protection of local business, prompted the
state legislatures to enact takeover statutes. See Boehm, State Interests and InterstateCommerce: A Look at the Theoretical Underpinnings of Takeover Legislation, 36 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 733, 741-46 (1979) (state takeover statutes prompted by concern for investors, local
businesses, and quality of life within state boundaries); see also Note, The Constitutionality

of State Takeover Statutes: A Response to Great Western, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 872,904-05 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Response to Great Western] (speculations as to legislative intent of
state takeover statutes is futile).
21 See ALASKA STAT.

§§ 45.54.010-.120 (1980); ARK. STAT. ANN. S 67-1264 to -1264.14 (1980);

COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 11-51.5-101 to -108 (Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 36456 to -468
(West 1981 & Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 203 (Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 517.35
to .363 (West Supp. 1978) (repealed by 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-381, § 13); GA. CODE ANN. §5
14-6-1 to -15 (1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. SS 417E-1 to -15 (1976 & Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE §5
30-1501 to -1513 (1980 & Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1211h, SS 137.51 to .70 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1981-1982); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-3.14 to -11 (Burns Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. §§
502.211 to .215 (West Supp. 1981-1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. SS 17-1276 to -1284 (1981); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. % 292.560 to .991 (Bobbs-MeriU 1981); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:1500 to :1512 (West
Supp. 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, S 801-17 (Supp. 1982-1983) (amended 1982); MD. CORP.
& ASS'NS. CODE ANN. §§ 11-901 to -908 (Supp. 1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110C, SS 1-13
(West Supp. 1982-1983); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 451.901 to .917 (Supp. 1982-1983); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 80B.01-.13 (West Supp. 1983); MISS. CODE ANN. SS75-72-101 to -121 (Supp. 1982);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 409.500 to .565 (Vernon 1979); NEB. REV. STAT. SS 21-2401 to -2417 (1977);
NEV. REV. STAT. §5 78.376 to .3778 (1981); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421-A:1 to :15 (1979); N.J.
STAT. ANN. S 49:5-1 to :19 (West Supp. 1982-1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1600-14 (McKinney
Supp. 1982-1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 78B-1 to -11 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. S 1707.041
(Baldwin 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, S§ 431-51 (West Supp. 1982-1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
70, §§ 71-85 (Purdon Supp. 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. S 35-2-10 to -110 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1982);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. S 47-32-1 to -47 (Supp. 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-2101 to -2114
(1979 & Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 61-4-1 to-13 (1978 & Supp. 1981); VA. CODE 55 13.1-528
to -541 (1978 & Supp. 1982); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 552.01-.25 (West Special Pamphlet 1982); Tex.
Administrative Guidelines for Minimum Standards in Tender Offers 065.15.00.100 to .800,
reprintedin 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 55,671-82 (1977). See generally ARANOW, EINBORN. &
BERLSTEIN. supra note 11, at 207-17 (survey of different forms of state takeover statutes).
See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. S 67-1264.1 (1980) (Arkansas takeover act's disclosure re-
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generally regulate tender offers with provisions that differ significantly
from the provisions of the Williams Act.' A problem common to many
state takeover statutes is that the state statutes disrupt the Williams
Act's regulatory neutrality by delaying the commencement or consummation of tender offers, thereby giving target management additional time

quirements); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1211/2, S 137.54 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982) (Illinois takeover
act's disclosure requirements); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. S 451.908 (Supp. 1982-1983); see State

Securities Regulation, supra note 20, at 768 (state takeover statutes generally follow
philosophy of federal securities regulations); see also Sowards & Mofsky, supra note 9, at
507 (basic philosophy of federal securities regulation is to protect investors by requiring
full and fair disclosures).
" See ARANow, EINHORN & BERLSTEIN, supranote 11, at 234-45 (tabulation of federal and
state tender offer regulations). Although the terms of state takeover statutes vary considerably from state to state, several general characteristics are prevalent. See Wilner &
Landy, supranote 20, at 3-9 (general characteristics of state takeover statutes). The majority
of state takeover statutes require tender offerors to disclose the material terms of a tender
offer in advance of the takeover bid's commencement. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. S
11:51:5-104(1) (Supp. 1982) (offeror must file 10 days before commencement of bid); HAWAII
REV. STAT. S 417E-3(t) (1976) (offeror must file 60 days before bid's commencement); VA. CODE
§ 13.1-531 (Supp. 1982) (offeror must file 20 days before bid's commencement). But see 17
C.F.R. S 240.14d-2(b) (1982) (SEC regulation designating commencement of tender offers);
infra notes 125-35 and accompanying text (SEC regulation 14d-2(b) preempts state precommencement notice requirements). Some state takeover acts require a tender offeror
to provide the state's securities agency with the same information the offeror must disclose
in a schedule 14D-1 disclosure statement. See, e.g., COLO.REV. STAT. 5 11-51.5-104 (Supp. 1982);
MD. CORP. &Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 11-902 (Supp. 1982); see also supranote 11 (informational requirements of schedule 14D-1 disclosure statement). Most state takeover statutes, however,
require tender offerors to disclose more information than the Williams Act and SEC regulations require. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW 5 1603 (McKinney Supp. 1982-83); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1707.041 (Baldwin 1982); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70 S 75 (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983).
In addition to the different disclosure requirements, a state's takeover statute usually
empowers the state's securities agency to order a hearing concerning a takeover bid. See,
e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36460 (Supp. 1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-3.1-7 (Burns Supp.
1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 451.907 (Supp. 1982-1983). Moreover, some state takeover
statutes require the state's securities agency to hold a hearing at the request of a target
company. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. S 36-460 (West Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE S 30-1503
(1980). Most state statutes also enable the state's securities commission to stop a tender
offer from proceeding until completion of the hearing process and to stop an offer completely if the state official decides against the offeror. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. S292.580
(Bobbs-Merill 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:5-4 (West Supp. 1982-1983); VA. CODE 513.1-531 (Supp.
1982). Although a majority of states limit the scope of the hearings to whether the offeror
has satisfied the state statute's disclosure requirements, a minority of state takeover statutes
permit the state's securities agency to evaluate the substantive merits of the tender offer.
See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 409.515 (Vernon 1979) (commissioner may evaluate whether offeror complied with disclosure requirements); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW S1604 (McKinney Supp.
1982-1983) (requires hearing to determine whether offeror provided full and fair disclosures);
TENN. CODE ANN. S 48-2104(5) (1979) (securities commissioner may permanently stop inequitable
tender offer).
The state takeover statutes also contain various substantive provisions that differ
from the substantive protections that the Williams Act provides shareholders. See ARANOW,
EINHORN, & BERLSTEIN, supra note 11, at 234-45 (comparison of Williams Act provisions to
state takeover statute provisions); see also supra note 13 (Williams Act's substantive provi-
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to defeat a takeover bid.' Furthermore, many state takeover laws modify
the Williams Act's market approach to investor protection by enabling
a state official to review the merits of a takeover bid and decide whether
the offer may proceed.25 Although the purpose of the state statutes is
to protect local investors,2 6 most state takeover statutes effect tender offers nation-wide by requiring an offeror to comply with the statute's procedural and disclosure requirements in the offeror's transactions with
shareholders residing both inside and outside the regulating state.'
The extraterritorial reach of the state statutes and the statutes'
variance with the Williams Act's regulatory neutrality and market ap-

sions). Examples of the types of substantive provisions the state legislatures have enacted
are minimum and maximum offering periods, shareholder withdrawal rights, and the time
period during which a bidder must accept on a pro rata basis the securities shareholders
have tendered. See ARANOW, EINHORN, & BERLSTEIN, supra note 11, at 234-35 (tabulation of
state substantive provisions).
See Edgar v. Mite Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629, 2638-39 (1982) (plurality opinion) (state statutes
that delay commencement of tender offers upset balance Congress established); National
City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1131 (8th Cir. 1982) (delays in commencement
and consummation of tender offers threaten viability of tender offers). State takeover statutes
with hearing provisions may delay the commencement or consummation of a tender offer
if the state's securities agency decides to hold a hearing. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
S 292.570 (Bobbs-Merill 1981) (Kentucky director of securities could delay commencement
of tender offer up to 40 days); MINN. STAT. ANN. S 80B.03 (West Supp. 1983) (Minnesota commissioner of securities could delay commencement of tender offer up to 30 days); UTAH
CODE ANN. S 61-4-4 (Supp. 1981) (Utah securities commission may delay commencement of
tender offer up to 70 days); see also supra note 22 (most state takeover statutes enable
state's securities commission to halt tender offer until completion of hearing). The majority
of courts that have examined the constitutionality of state takeover statutes have held
that state created delays disrupt the Williams Act's neutral approach to tender offer regulation by giving incumbent management additional time in which to take defensive actions.
See infra note 28 (cases holding that Williams Act preempts state takeover statutes that
disrupt regulatory scheme Congress enacted).
" See supra note 23 (some state takeover statutes enable state securities commissioner
to evaluate equity of tender offer).
See supra note 20 (objectives of state takeover statutes).
See Tender Offer Statutes Reconsidered,supra note 20, at 515 (state takeover statutes
apply to offerors' transactions with shareholders residing in other states). Although state
takeover statutes regulate the actions of tender offerors, the state statutes base jurisdiction over tender offers on the target corporation's connection to the regulating state. See,
e.g., IND. CODE ANN. S 23-2-3.1-1 (Burns Supp. 1982, MD. CORP. &ASS'NS. CODE ANN. S 11-901(i)
(Supp. 1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. S 451.904 (Supp. 1982-1983). State legislatures have
adopted a number of criteria for determining whether a target corporation has sufficient
nexus to a state to warrant the state's regulation of a takeover bid. See generally ARANOW,
EINHORN, &BERLSTEIN, supranote 11, at 234-45 (survey of state takeover statutes). Incorporation of the target corporation in the regulating state satisfies the jurisdictional requirements
of all state takeover statutes. See id. A tender offer also will be subject to regulation in
most states if the target company has substantial assets or a principal place of business
in the regulating state. See id. The state statutes base jurisdiction on the target company's
nexus to the regulating state to prevent tender offerors from avoiding the requirements
of a particular state by not extending the offer to shareholders residing in that state.
ARANOW & EINHORN, supra note 2, at 157.
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proach have rendered the state statutes susceptible to constitutional
challenges under the commerce clause and the supremacy clause.' In Edgar
v. Mite Corp.,29 the United States Supreme Court held that the Illinois
Business Takeover Act (Illinois Act)" impermissibly burdened interstate
commerce21 Mite had initiated a cash tender offer for all outstanding shares
U See Edgar v. Mite Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629, 2641-43 (1982) (Illinois takeover statute
violates commerce clause); Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576, 579-82 (4th Cir. 1983)
(Virginia takeover statute violates commerce clause); Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp.,
[1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,822, at 94,217-20 (6th Cir. 1982) (Michigan
takeover statute violates commerce clause); National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687
F.2d 1122, 1128-33 (8th Cir. 1982) (Missouri takeover statute violates commerce and supremacy
clauses); Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181, 188-91 (3rd Cir. 1980) (New Jersey takeover
statute violates supremacy clause); Mite Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 493-503 (7th Cir. 1980)
(Illinois takeover statute violates commerce and supremacy clauses), affid sub nom. Edgar
v. Mite Corp., 102 S.Ct. 2629 (1982); Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256,1279-86
(5th Cir. 1978) (Idaho takeover statute violates commerce and supremacy clauses), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); Occidental
Petroleum Corp. v. Cities Serv. Co., [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,063, at
95,042-43 (W.D. Okla. 1982) (Oklahoma takeover statute violates commerce clause); Bendix
Corp. v. Martin-Marietta Corp., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,821, at
92,211-12 (D.Md. 1982) (Maryland takeover statute violates commerce and supremacy clauses);
Natomas Co. v. Bryan, 512 F. Supp. 191,193 (D. Nev. 1981) (Nevada takeover statute violates
commerce and supremacy clauses); Crane Co. v. Lam, 509 F. Supp. 782, 785-91 (E.D. Pa.
1981) (Pennsylvania takeover statute violates commerce and supremacy clauses); Hi-Shear
Indus. v. Campbell, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,804 at 90,030-34 (D.S.C.
1980) (South Carolina takeover statute violates commerce and supremacy clauses); Brascam
Ltd. v. Lassiter, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.(CCH) 98,247, at 91,625 (E.D.
La. 1979) (Louisiana takeover statute violates supremacy clause); Dart Indus. v. Conrad,
462 F. Supp. 1, 12-14 (S.D. Ind. 1978) (Delaware takeover statute violates commerce and
supremacy clauses); Esmark, Inc. v. Strode, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.(CCH)
98,828, at 94,246-48 (Ky. 1982) (Kentucky takeover statute violates commerce and supremacy
clauses); Kelly v. Beta-X Corp., 103 Mich. App. 51, 59, 302 N.W.2d 596, 600 (Mich. Ct. App.
1981) (Michigan takeover statute violates supremacy clause); Eure v. Grand Metropolitan
Ltd., [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,694, at 98,648 (N.C. Super. Ct. 1980)
(North Carolina takeover statute violates supremacy clause); see also supra note 21 (state
takeover statutes). But see AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929, 933-40 (S.D. Ohio
i979) (Ohio takeover statute violates neither commerce nor supremacy clause); Sharon Steel
Corp. v. Whaland, 121 N.H. 607, 701-04, 433 A.2d 1250, 1254-57 (N.H. 1981) (New Hampshire
takeover statute violates neither commerce clause nor supremacy clause), vacated, 102 S.
Ct. 3474 (1982) (vacated and remanded for consideration in light of Edgarv. Mite Corp.);
Wylain, Inc. v. TRE Corp., 412 A.2d 338, 343-49 (Del. Ch. 1980) (Delaware takeover statute
violates neither commerce clause nor supremacy clause).
U 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982).
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1211/2, § 137.51 to .70 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983). The jurisdictional provisions of the Illinois Act provided that a tender offeror would have to comply
with the Illinois statute if at least ten percent of a target corporation's shareholders resided
in Illinois or the target corporation had two of three designated connections with Illinois.
See id. S 137.52-10. The designated connections were that Illinois must be the location of
the target company's principal office, the target corporation's state of incorporation, or
the home of shareholders holding at least ten percent of the target's stated capital and
paid-in-surplus. Id.

",102 S. Ct. at 2641-43.
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of Chicago Rivet and Machine Company.n On the same day that Mite commenced the tender offer, Mite filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois seeking a declaratory judgment that
the Illinois Act violated the commerce clause and the supremacy clause.'
The district court ruled that the Williams Act preempted the Illinois Act
and that the Illinois Act impermissibly burdened interstate commerce.3
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision on both grounds.'
On appeal, the Supreme Court evaluated the constitutionality of the
Illinois statute using the test the Court had enunciated in Pike v. Bruce
Church,Inc. ,3 for determining whether a state statute is unconstitutional
under the commerce clause. 7 Under the Pike v. Bruce Church test, a state
statute that indirectly regulates interstate commerce violates the commerce clause if the burden the state statute imposes on interstate com38
merce substantially exceeds the state statute's legitimate local benefits.
The Mite majority held that the Illinois Act imposed substantial burdens
on interstate commerce by giving the Illinois Secretary of State the power
to stop a nation-wide tender offer. 9 The Court stated that permitting a
32 Id.
at 2633-34. Chicago Rivet and Machine Co. is an Illinois corporation with the
corporation's principal executive offices in Illinois and over 25/0 of the corporation's
shareholders residing in Illinois. Mite Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 488 (7th Cir. 1980), affd
sub nom. Edgar v. Mite Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982); see supra note 30 (Illinois Act's jurisdictional requirements).
102 S. Ct. at 2634.

4

Id.

' See Mite Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 493-503 (7th Cir. 1979), affid sub noa. Edgar
v. Mite Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982).
" 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). The commerce clause grants Congress the power to regulate
commerce among the states. U.S. CONST. art. 1, S 8, cl. 3. The Supreme Court has interpreted
the commerce clause as limiting the power of the states to enact legislation that affects
interstate commerce. See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370-71 (1976).
Nonetheless, state legislation that affects interstate commerce may be constitutional if the
state legislation serves legitimate state interests without discriminating against interstate
commerce. Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440 (1978). The Supreme
Court in Pike v. Bruce Church,Inc., set forth a two step test for determining whether state
legislation impermissibly interferes with interstate commerce. 397 U.S. at 142. First, although
the commerce clause does permit some incidental regulation of interstate commerce, a state
may not directly regulate interstate commerce. Id.; see Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268
U.S. 189, 199 (1925) (direct regulation of interstate commerce is prohibited). Second, an incidental regulation of interstate commerce is constitutional only if the state statute regulates
even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local interest and if the putative local benefits
exceed the burdens the state statute imposes on interstate commerce. 397 U.S. at 142.
102 S. Ct. at 2641-42.
See supra note 36 (Pike v. Bruce Church test).
102 S. Ct. at 2642; see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1211/, S 137.57(A-(B) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1982-1983) (Illinois Secretary of State may order hearing concerning takeover bid and delay
commencement of tender offer). State takeover statutes impose numerous burdens on interstate securities transactions. See Commerce ClauseLimitations, supra note 7, at 1149-52
(adverse effects of state takeover statutes on interstate commerce). The most objectionable
burden state takeover statutes impose on interstate commerce is the state statutes' impact
on nation-wide tender offers. See 102 S. Ct. at 2641-42. The nation-wide reach of a state
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state official to block a nation-wide tender offer deprives shareholders
of the opportunity to sell the target corporation's securities at a premium,
hinders the efficient allocation of economic resources, and reduces management's incentive to perform effectively and maintain high stock prices.4"
The Mite Court, however, found few local benefits to counterbalance the
Illinois Act's substantial burden on interstate commerce.41
The Illinois Secretary of State claimed that the Illinois legislature's
interests in protecting resident shareholders and in regulating the internal affairs of Illinois corporations outweighed any burdens the Illinois Act
imposed on interstate securities transactions. 42 Although the Mite Court
denied that the Illinois legislature has any interest in protecting nonresident shareholders, the Court acknowledged that the Illinois legislature
has a legitimate interest in protecting local shareholders. 4 The Court,
however, assigned little importance to the Illinois legislature's recognized
interest in protecting resident shareholders because the Illinois Act essentially duplicated the Williams Act." Moreover, the Mite majority suggested
takeover statute enables a single state's securities agency to decide if a tender offer may
proceed anywhere. Id.; see supra,note 23 (most state takeover statutes enable state securities
commissioner to stop tender offer until completion of hearing). The delays incumbent in
the state takeover laws also impose substantial burdens on interstate commerce. See MartinMarietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,822,
at 94,218 (6th Cir. 1982) (delays upset timing of interstate tender offers). Delays that the
state statutes cause burden interstate commerce by disrupting the normal securities market
and discouraging tender offers. See Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576, 580 (4th Cir. 1982).
102 S. Ct. at 2642.
Id. at 2642-43. The majority of courts that have examined the local benefits of state
takeover statutes have held that any benefit the state law provides shareholders is marginal
because the Williams Act fully protects investors. See Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d
576, 581 (4th Cir. 1983); Mite Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 500 (7th Cir. 1980); Mesa Petroleum
Co. v. Cities Serv. Co., [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,064, at 95,049 (W.D.
Okla. 1982). Commentators, however, have identified several benefits state takeover laws
provide local shareholders. See Comment, State Regulation of Tender Offers: How Much is
Constitutional?,33 BAYLOR L. REv. 657, 674-75 (1981) [hereinafter cited as How Much is Constitutional?]; Tender Offer Statutes Reconsidered, supra note 20, at 524, 529-30. The delays
incumbent in state takeover statutes provide investors with more time to make informed
investment decisions. See How Much is Constitutional?,supra, at 674 (state takeover statutes
eliminate pressure on investors to make hasty decision on whether or not to tender); Tender
Offer Statutes Reconsidered, supra note 27, at 524 (state statutes reduce pressure on
shareholders to tender immediately). Additionally, delay may benefit local investors with
higher premiums because of competitive bidding for a target company's securities on the
open market during a delay. See Tender Offer Statutes Reconsidred, supra note 20, at 524
(delay encourages higher bid for target corporation's stocks); Response to Great Western,
supra, note 20, at 901-02 (delay enables competing offeror to make tender offer at higher
price). But see infranotes 59.61 and accompanying text (delay frustrates objectives of Williams
Act).
42

102 S. Ct. at 2642.

'

Id.

"I d. Compare ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121/2, S 137.59(C) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983)
(shareholder may withdraw tendered shares during first 17 days of offer); id. S 137.59(D)
(offeror must purchase securities pro rata if shareholders tender more securities than in-
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that where the Illinois statute differed from the Williams Act, the Illinois
statute actually might harm investors by increasing the possibility that
management would be able to defeat a takeover bid before the
45
shareholders had evaluated the tender offer.
The Mite Court also rejected the Illinois Secretary of State's contention that the burdens the Illinois Act imposed on interstate commerce
were permissible because the burdens were the result of Illinois'
acknowledged right to regulate the internal affairs of a local corporation.4"
The internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of laws principle that permits
a corporation's state of incorporation to regulate the internal affairs of
the corporation to the exclusion of other states' regulations.' The Mite
vestor intended to purchase); and id. 5 137.59(E) (offeror must pay highest price he has
offered to all shareholders that have tendered if offeror varies terms of offer during takeover
bid); with 15 U.S.C. S 78n(d)(6) (1976) (offeror must purchase pro rata shares tendered during the first 10 days of offer if shareholders have tendered more shares in first 10 days
than offeror intended to purchase); id. S 78n(d)(7) (1976) (if offeror increases purchase price
then offeror must pay higher price to all shareholder that have tendered); and 17 C.F.R.
S 240.14d-7 (1982) (shareholder may withdraw tendered shares anytime within 15 days after
commencement of offer).
" See 102 S. Ct. at 2642 (increased risk that tender offer might fail outweighs possible
benefits of delays); see also supra note 19 (delays increase management's chances of defeating
takeover bid).
See 102 S. Ct. at 2642-43 (internal affairs doctrine is inapplicable to tender offers).
' See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975) (state of incorporation governs corporation's
internal affairs). A minority of courts that have examined the constitutionality of state
takeover statutes have held that state takeover statutes do not violate the commerce clause
because the state's extraterritorial regulation of tender offers is analogous to the states'
regulation of the internal affairs of locally incorporated companies. See supranote 28 (courts
holding that state takeover statutes do not violate commerce clause). Those courts upholding
state statutes often compare them to constitutionally permissible state regulation of proxy
contests. See AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929, 939 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (tender
offers are functional equivalents of proxy contests). A corporation's state of incorporation
may regulate proxy contests pursuant to the internal affairs doctrine. See Wilner & Landy,
supra note 20, at 17. Some commentators have argued that courts should allow a corporation's state of incorporation to regulate tender offers because successful takeovers may
materially alter the internal structure of local target corporations. Boehm, supra note 20,
at 743, 756; Burch, Edgar v. Mite Corporation: A ProposedAnalysis, 17 TULSA L.J. 229,240-50
(1981); Langevoort, supra note 19, at 221-23; McCauliff, Federalismandthe Constitutionality
of State Takeover Statutes, 67 VA. L. REv. 295, 303-04 (1981); Sargent, On the Validity of State
Takeover Regulation:State Responses to Mite and Kidwell, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 689,724-25 (1981);
Shipman, Some Thoughts About the Role of State Takeover Legislation: The Ohio Takeover
Act, 21 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 722, 741-45 (1970); cf How Much is Constitutional?,supra note
41, at 672 (pseudo-foreign corporation doctrine is better theory for upholding validity of
state takeover statutes). State proxy laws, however, govern the relationship between the
corporation and the corporation's shareholders during an internal struggle for control of
the corporation. Wilner & Landy, supra note 20, at 17. State takeover statutes govern the
securities transactions between a corporation's shareholders and third parties not connected
with the corporation. See id. (internal affairs doctrine cannot justify state regulation of
tender offers); Commerce ClauseLimitations, supra note 7, at 1154-55 (in tender offer situation relationship between corporation and shareholders that justifies regulating proxy contests has not yet formed). The majority of courts that have examined the constitutionality
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majority, however, held that the internal affairs doctrine does not apply
in the context of a tender offer because the internal affairs doctrine is
limited to the relationship between a locally incorporated corporation and
the corporation's officers, directors, and shareholders." The Court noted
that the Illinois Act regulated the relationship between shareholders of
local corporations and tender offerors who might have no connection with
Illinois other than the takeover bid.49 The Mite Court concluded that the
Illinois Act violated the commerce clause because the questionable benefits
the Illinois statute provided local shareholders were insufficient to justify
the statute's substantial burden on interstate commerce."
Although the Mite majority did not reach the preemption issue, a
plurality of the Court argued that the Illinois Act also violated the
supremacy clause.' The plurality's reasoning is indicative of the analysis
of state takeover statutes have concluded that the internal affairs doctrine cannot support
the validity of state takeover statutes because tender offers have nothing to do with internal corporate procedures. See 102 S. Ct. at 264243 (internal affairs doctrine not applicable
to state takeover statutes).
11102 S. Ct. at 2642. Specific internal affairs subject to regulation by a corporation's
state of incorporation include the election of directors, adoption of by-laws, voting rights,
stockholders meetings, fiduciary duties, and transfer of shares. See Response to Great Western,
supra note 20, at 931-32.
11102 S. Ct. at 2643. The Mite Court stated that the Illinois Secretary of State's contention that the Illinois Act was constitutional -inder the internal affairs doctrine was "incredible" since the Illinois Act could apply to corporations not incorporated in Illinois. Id.
The Court concluded that Illinois had no interest in regulating the internal affairs of foreign
corporations. Id.
Id. A plurality of four justices held that the Illinois Act was unconstitutional as
a direct regulation of interstate commerce. Id. at 2640-41; see supra note 36 (state statutes
that directly regulate interstate commerce violate commerce clause). The four justice plurality
held that the extraterritorial reach of the Illinois Act directly restrained interstate commerce by preventing a tender offeror from conducting interstate securities transactions
with shareholders in other states. 102 S. Ct. 2641. The plurality noted that although twentyseven percent of Chicago Rivet's shareholders resided in Illinois, the Illinois statute could
apply equally to a tender offer in which no shareholders resided in Illinois. Id.; see supra
note 30 (Illinois Act's jurisdictional provision). Furthermore, the four justice plurality stated
that permitting multiple states to regulate interstate securities transactions would overly
complicate the regulation of nation-wide tender offers, thereby stifling takeover bids. Id.
at 2642.
1, Id. at 2637-40. Six of the Justices held that the Illinois Act was an unconstitutional
violation of the commerce clause. Id. at 2640-43. (C.J. Burger, J. White, J. Blackmun, J.
Powell, J. Stevens, J. O'Connor); see supra text accompanying notes 36-50 (Illinois Act violates
commerce clause). Five justices ruled that the Illinois Act impermissibly burdened interstate
commerce. 102 S. Ct. at 2641-43 (J. Burger, J. White, J. Powell, J. Stevens, J. O'Connor);
see supratext accompanying notes 36-50 (Illinois Act impermissibly burdens interstate commerce). Four justices held that the Illinois Act was unconstitutional as a direct restraint
on interstate commerce. 102 S. Ct. at 2640-41 (C.J. Burger, J. White, J. Blackmun, J. Powell,
J. Stevens); see supra note 50 (Illinois Act directly regulates interstate commerce). Three
justices ruled that the Williams Act preempted the Illinois Act. 102 S. Ct. at 2637-40 (C.J.
Burger, J. White, J. Blackmun); see infra text accompanying notes 51-65 (Illinois Act violates
supremacy clause). Three justices ruled the case moot and did not address the constitutional issues. 102 S. Ct. at 2648-54 (J. Marshall, J. Brennan, and J. Rehnquist dissenting).
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other courts have adopted when examining whether the Williams Act

preempts a state takeover statute.52 Justice White, writing for the plurality, noted that the legislative history of the Williams Act indicates that
Congress intended to permit states to regulate tender offers.- The Mite
plurality, however, stated that the Williams Act preempts a state statute
if the statute directly conflicts with a provision of the Williams Act or
if the state statute frustrates the Williams Act's objective of protecting
shareholders.'
The Mite plurality reasoned that the Illinois statute's precommencement disclosure requirements 5 and hearing requirements'
disrupted the regulatory balance Congress found essential to achieving

I See supra note 28 (cases holding state takeover statutes unconstitutional under
supremacy clause).
' 102 S. Ct. at 2635; see 15 U.S.C. S 78bb(a) (1976) (state legislatures may enact securities
regulations that do not conflict with federal securities laws).
' 102 S. Ct. at 2637-40. The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution states
that federal law is the supreme law of the land. U.S. CONST. art. VI, S 2. An Act of Congress
or an administrative regulation promulgated pursuant to an Act of Congress preempts state
laws that frustrate the purposes and objectives of Congress. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (state statute that is obstacle to accomplishment and execution of congressional purposes and objectives is unconstitutional). The Supreme Court in Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., set forth a sequence of analysis for determining whether federal legislation
preempts a state law. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525-26 (1977). First, a federal
statute preempts a state law if Congress expressly intended to exclude the states from
regulating in a particular area. Id. at 525; see Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator, 331 U.S. 218, 236
(1947). Second, even in the absence of an explicit congressional intent to preempt, a federal
statute preempts state law if Congress implicitly intended to preempt state law. 430 U.S.
at 525; see Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973) (pervasive regulation
infers congressional intent to preempt). Third, even if Congress neither explicitly nor implicitly intended to preempt state law, a federal statute preempts state law if the operation
of the state law directly conflicts with the operation of the federal law. 430 U.S. at 526;
see Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963). Finally,
a federal statute preempts a state law if, under the facts of the particular case, the state
law frustrates the purposes and objectives of Congress. 430 U.S. at 526; see Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
" See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1211/2, S 137.54(B), (E) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983) (Illinois
Act's pre-commencement notice requirements). The Illinois Act required a tender offeror
to notify the Illinois Secretary of State and the target company 20 days before the commencement of a tender offer that the offeror intends to make an offer and the proposed
offer's material terms. Id.
' See id. 5 137.57(A), (B), (E) (Illinois Act's hearing requirements). The Illinois Act permitted the Illinois Secretary of State to order a hearing before a tender offer commences
to determine whether the takeover bid is equitable. Id. S 137.57(A), (E). The Illinois Act
required the Secretary of State to order a hearing upon written request by the directors
of the target company or upon written request of the shareholders that own at least ten
percent of any class of the target's securities and reside in Illinois. Id. S 137.57(A). Once
the Secretary of State ordered a hearing, the Illinois Act prevented the offer from commencing until the Secretary of State ordered a decision on the merits of the takeover bid.
Id. S 137.57(B). If the Illinois Secretary of State found that the tender offer did not provide
adequate disclosures or that the takeover bid was inequitable, the Illinois statute required
the Secretary to stop the offer by denying registration of the tender offer. Id. § 137.57(E).
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adequate shareholder protection.51 Justice White stated that Illinois' precommencement disclosure requirements upset the balance the Williams
Act established between tender offerors and target corporations by providing target corporations with additional time to take defensive actions."
The Mite plurality also argued that the Illinois statute's hearing requirement similarly disrupted the regulatory balance of the Williams Act by
potentially delaying the commencement of a tender offer.59 The plurality
stated that any delay would upset the William Act's regulatory balance
by providing target management with additional time to frustrate a tender
offer at the shareholders' expense." Justice White stated that the Williams
Act preempts state takeover statutes that provide a target corporation's
management with any undue advantage that would disrupt the Williams
Act's regulatory neutrality."
Moreover, the Mite plurality reasoned that the Illinois Act conflicted
with the Williams Act's market approach.62 Justice White noted that the
Illinois Act deprived shareholders of the opportunity to evaluate tender
offers by granting the Illinois Secretary of State the power to stop an
inequitable takeover bid.3 The Mite plurality argued that a state statute
that substituted investor protection for investor autonomy conflicted with
the market approach of the Williams Act." The Mite plurality concluded
that the Williams Act preempts the Illinois Act because the Illinois statute
frustrates the Williams Act's objective of investor protection by disrupting the regulatory scheme Congress found essential to protecting the interests of shareholders. 5
Several recent decisions have refined and expanded the Mite Court's
ruling on the constitutionality of state takeover statutes.6 In Telvest, Inc.
" See 102 S. Ct. at 2637-40 (Illinois Act disrupts market approach and regulatory neutrality Congress found essential to investor protection); see also notes 7-19 and accompanying
text (congressional purposes and objectives of Williams Act).

1 1 102 S. Ct. at 2637; see Langevoort, supra note 19, at 238 (time is management's most
potent weapon); supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (Congress enacted scheme of

regulatory neutrality).
11102 S. Ct. at 2638-39; see supra note 56 (Illinois Secretary of State may order hearing and delay commencement of tender offer).
'1

102 S. Ct. at 2639.
See id at 2636, 2639 (Congress intended to protect investors by establishing a

regulatory balance between offerors and management); see also supranote 28 (cases holding

that delays disrupt Williams Act's neutral approach to tender offer regulation).
a 102 S. Ct., at 2640; see supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text (Congress adopted
market approach to investor protection).
1 102 S. Ct. at 239-40; see supra note 56 (Illinois Secretary of State may halt inequitable
takeover bid).
"

102 S. Ct. at 2640; see supra note 28 (cases holding that state statutes that conflict

with Williams Act's market approach violate supremacy clause).
I See 102 S. Ct., at 263740 (Illinois Act conflicts with market approach and regulatory
neutrality that Congress found essential to achieve objective of investor protection); see
also supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text (regulatory scheme of Williams Act).
" See Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576, 582 (4th Cir. 1983) (Virginia takeover

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

1242

[Vol. 40:1227

v. Bradshaw'7 the Fourth Circuit held that Virginia's Take Over Bid
Disclosure Act (Virginia Act)68 impermissibly burdened interstate
commerce. 9 The provisions of the Virginia Act at issue regulated creeping tender offers instead of cash tender offers." A creeping tender offer
is an acquisition strategy that enables a purchaser to achieve a substantial position in a company through open market purchases over an extended period of time." The Virginia Act's creeping tender offer provisions required a shareholder that intended to acquire control of a Virginia
corporation to comply with the state statute before purchasing additional
shares of the corporation. 2 The Virginia law established a presumption
that a shareholder intended to acquire control of a Virginia corporation
when the shareholder owned more than ten percent of the corporation
and had purchased more than one percent of the corporation's stock in
the past year."3 If a shareholder did not intend to acquire cbntrol of a
Virginia corporation but intended to continue purchasing the corporation's
securities, the shareholder had to persuade the Virginia Corporation Commission that the purchases were not for the purpose of changing control
of the corporation. 4 After acquiring more than ten percent of American
Furniture Company through open market purchases, Telvest sought a

statute impermissibly burdens interstate commerce); National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp.
687 F.2d 1122, 1133 (8th Cir. 1982) (Missouri takeover statute impermissibly burdens interstate commerce and disrupts Williams Act's regulatory neutrality); Agency Rent-A-Car,
Inc. v. Connolly, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,776, at 93,947 (1st Cir.
1982) (sanctions provision for violating Massachusetts takeover statute is not unconstitutional under supremacy clause); Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., [1982 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,822, at 94,219-20 (6th Cir. 1982) (Michigan takeover statute impermissibly burdens interstate commerce); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. City Serv. Co., [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,063, at 95,043 (W.D. Okla. 1982) (Oklahoma takeover
statute impermissibly burdens interstate commerce); Bendix Corp. v. Martin-Marietta Corp.,
[1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,821, at 94,211-12 (D. Md. 1982) (Maryland
takeover statute violates commerce and supremacy clauses); Esmark, Inc. v. Strode, [1982
Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,828, at 94,246-48 (Ky. 1982) (Kentucky takeover
statute violates commerce and supremacy clauses).
697 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1983).
VA. CODE SS 13.1-528 to -541 (1978 & Supp. 1982).
697 F.2d at 582.
71 See VA. CODE § 13.1-529(b)(iii) (Supp. 1982) (Virginia Act applies to creeping tender offers). Several state legislatures have enacted statutes regulating creeping tender offers.
See e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. S 292.570(2) (Bobbs-Merill 1981); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 110C,
5 3 (West Supp. 1982-1983); NEB. REV. STAT. S 21-2403 (1977).
1 See 697 F.2d at 577 n.1 (definition of creeping tender offer); cf. supra note 1 (definition of tender offer). See generally Note, Developments in CorporateTakeover Techniques:
Creeping Tender Offers, Lockup Agreements, and Standstill Agreements, 39 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1095, 1095-107 (1982).
"2See VA. CODE 5 13.1-529(b)(iii) (Supp. 1982) (offeror must register intent to acquire control of corporation with Virginia Corporation Commission).
3

Id.

- See id. S 13.1-529(b)(vi) (Virginia Corporation Commission may exempt purchaser from
complying with Virginia Act if purchaser proves no intent to change control of corporation).
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tender offer provisions of the
declaratory judgment that the creeping
75
unconstitutional.
were
Act
Virginia
The Telvest court noted that although the Virginia Act applied only
to the acquisition of securities of Virginia companies, 6 the Virginia Act
affected interstate commerce by potentially applying to securities transactions between shareholders residing in other states. 7 The court then
applied the balancing test of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.," to determine
whether the extraterritorial effects of the Virginia Act impermissibly
burdened interstate commerce.' The Telvest court identified numerous
burdens the Virginia statute imposed on interstate commerce." The court
stated that the statute disrupted the market for securities of Virginia
corporations by requiring an offeror to postpone purchases of Virginia
corporations' stocks, deprived shareholders of an opportunity to sell
securities at a premium, discouraged investment in Virginia companies,
impaired the ability of the free market to price securities efficiently, and
reduced the incentive for incumbent management to perform effectively."
Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Mite, the Telvest court ruled
that the Virginia legislature had no legitimate interest in protecting
shareholders residing in other states.82 Moreover, the Telvest court stated
that the benefits the Virginia law provided local shareholders were uncertain because the Williams Act already provided protection to investors
during creeping tender offers.' The Telvest court noted that the Williams
Act requires a purchaser that has acquired more than five percent of a
corporation's securities to file a disclosure statement revealing any plans
for acquiring control of the target corporation.' The Telvest court concluded that although the Virginia Act's creeping tender offer provisions
imposed a lesser burden on interstate commerce than the hearing provisions the Mite court examined,' the Virginia law's benefits to local investors were too speculative to sustain the law's validity."
I See 697 F.2d at 578 (Telvest had acquired 11.64% of the outstanding stock of American
Furniture Co.).
7" See VA. CODE § 13.1-529(b)(iii) (Supp. 1982) (offeror that intends to acquire control of
corporation incorporated in Virginia must comply with Virginia Act); cf. supra note 30 (Illinois Act's jurisdictional requirements).
" 697 F.2d at 579.
71

397 U.S. 137 (1970) see supranotes 36-38 and accompanying text (Pikev. Bruce Church,

Inc. test).
,' 697 F.2d at 579-81.
Id- at 580.
81 Id.; cf.supra note 39 and accompanying text (most objectional burden state takeover
statutes impose on interstate commerce is state statutes' impact on nationwide tender offers).
82697 F.2d at 581; see supra text accompanying note 43 (Illinois legislature has no
legitimate interest in protecting shareholders residing in other states).
'

697 F.2d at 580-81.

See id. 15 U.S.C. S 78n(d) (1976).
See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (burdens Illinois Act imposed on interstate commerce).
" 697 F.2d at 582; see Edgar v. Mite Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629, 2642 (1982) (protections
U
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Although the state statute that the Mite court found to impermissibly
burden interstate commerce applied to securities transactions between
tender offerors and shareholders residing in other states, a number of
post-Mite cases have expanded the Mite decision and ruled unconstitutional state takeover statutes that apply only to that part of a tender
offer that involves local shareholders." For example, in Martin-Marietta
Illinois Act provided local shareholders are speculative); Esmark, Inc. v. Strode, [1982 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,828, at 94,248 (Ky. 1982) (Kentucky takeover statute impermissibly burdens interstate commerce). In Esmark, Inc. v. Strode, the Supreme Court
of Kentucky held that the Kentucky Take-Over Bids Disclosure Act (Kentucky Act) violated
the commerce clause. [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,828, at 94,248; see
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. SS 292.560 to .991 (Bobbs-Merill 1981) (Kentucky Act). Esmark had purchased on the open market over 11% of the outstanding shares of Reliance Universal, Inc.,
a Kentucky corporation in an attempt to eventually acquire control of Reliance. See [1982
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,828, at 94,244. Esmark, however, did not comply with the Kentucky Act, which prevented an offeror that had acquired 5% or more of
a Kentucky corporation's securities in the past year from commencing a tender offer if
the offeror did not disclose to the investors selling the securities any intention of acquiring
control of the corporation. Id.; see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. S.292.570(2) (Bobbs-Merill 1981) (Kentucky Act regulates creeping tender offers). The Kentucky director of securities filed suit
against Esmark for violating the Kentucky Act [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,828, at 94,244. The Esmark court noted that the disclosure and hearing provisions of the Kentucky Act were similar to the Illinois provisions the Mite Court found unconstitutional. Id. at 94,246-47; see Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292.570(1) (Bobbs-Merill 1981) (Kentucky Act's disclosure and hearing provisions); supra notes 56-57 (Illinois Act's disclosure
and hearing requirements). The Esmark court concluded that the similarities between the
Kentucky Act and the Illinois Act rendered the Mite decision controlling and that therefore
the Kentucky Act was invalid under the Commerce Clause. [1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,828, at 94,247-48.
" See Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
, 98,822, at 94,219-20 (6th Cir. 1982) (Michigan takeover statute violates commerce clause);
Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Cities Serv. Co., [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
99,063 at 95,043 (W.D. Okla. 1982) (Oklahoma takeover statute violates commerce clause).
In OccidentalPetroleum Corp. v. City Serv. Co., the United States District Court for the
Western District of Oklahoma held that the Oklahoma Take Over Bid Act (Oklahoma Act)
impermissibly burdened interstate commerce. [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
99,063 at 94,042-43; see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, SS 431-51 (West Supp. 1982-1983) (Oklahoma
Act). Occidental Petroleum had announced a nation-wide tender offer to acquire approximately 49% of the outstanding stock of City Service. [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 99,063, at 95,038. On the day that Occidental Petroleum announced an intention
to make a tender offer, Occidental Petroleum filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment
that the Oklahoma Act was unconstitutional. Id.
Like the Illinois Act, the Oklahoma Act permitted a state official to order a hearing
and stop an offer from proceeding. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, S 437 (West Supp. 1982-1983);
ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 1211/2, § 137.57(E) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983). The Administrator of the
Oklahoma Department of Securities, however, contended that the burdens the Oklahoma
Act imposed on interstate commerce were not great enough to render the Oklahoma Act
unconstitutional because the Oklahoma Act permitted the Administrator to halt only the
tender offer transactions between the offeror and local shareholders leaving the offer free
to proceed in other states. [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,063, at 95,042; The
OccidentalPetroleumcourt rejected the Oklahoma Administrator's argument and held that
the Oklahoma Act applied to securities transactions between offerors and shareholders
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Corp. v. Bendix Corp., the Sixth Circuit held that the Michigan Takeover
Offers Act (Michigan Act)' impermissibly burdened interstate commerce.'
Bendix had announced a nation-wide tender offer for up to forty-eight percent of the outstanding shares of Martin-Marietta." Martin-Marietta
retaliated to the Bendix takeover bid by initiating a counter tender offer
in a bid for control of Bendix.' On the day that Martin-Marietta announced

the counter offer, Martin-Marietta filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan seeking declaratory and in-

junctive relief against the enforcement of the Michigan Act.' From a denial
of injunctive relief, Martin-Marietta appealed to the Sixth Circuit. 4
Like the Illinois Act, the Michigan Act permitted a state official to
stop an offer from proceeding. 5 A Michigan circuit court, however, had
interpreted the Michigan Act as permitting the Director of the Michigan
corporations' stocks, deprived shareholders cof an opportunity to sell
tions between the offeror and local shareholders and that the offer was
free to proceed in other states. The Martin-Mariettacourt rejected the
Michigan Director's contention that the Michigan circuit court's ruling
limited the extraterritorial reach of the Michigan Act and therefore
rendered the Michigan Act constitutional The Martin-Mariettacourt held
that the Michigan law impermissibly burdened interstate securities transactions by preventing Michigan shareholders from participating in nationwide tender offers when an offeror refused to file a disclosure statement
with the Michigan Corporation and Securities Bureau. 8 The MartinMarietta court reasoned that the Michigan Act's effect of defeating naresiding in other states and that therefore the Oklahoma Act impermissibly burdened interstate commerce. Id. at 95,042-43. The court, however, noted that if the Oklahoma Act
applied only to transactions with resident shareholders, the Act would still impermissibly
burden interstate commerce because preventing Oklahoma shareholders from participating
in nation-wide tender offers potentially could defeat a tender offer that required Oklahoma
shares for success. Id. at 95,043.
[1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,822, 94,212 (6th Cir. 1982).
MICH. COMP. LAws. ANN. §§ 451.901 to .917 (Supp. 1982-1983).
' [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,822, at 94,217-20.
91Id. at 94,213.
92

Id.

9 Id.

Id. at 94,215.
Compare MICH.COMP. LAWS ANN.

S 451.914 (Supp. 1982-1983) (Michigan department
of commerce may bring suit in state court to enjoin offeror from proceeding if appears
that offeror has or will violate the Michigan Act) Uith ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 12 11/2, § 137.57(E)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983) (Illinois Secretary of State may stop tender offer if offeror
does not provide adequate disclosures or if takeover bid is inequitable).
" [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,822, at 94,215. The Circuit Court
for the County of Oakland had issued an order that limited the term "offerees" to Michigan
residents. Id.; see MICH. Com.LAWS ANN. S 451.903(1) (Supp. 1982-1983) ("offeree" means
shareholder whose securities tender offeror is attempting to acquire).
" [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,822 at 94,219.
'4 Id. at 94,220.
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tional takeover bids when an offeror needed the shares of Michigan investors to complete the takeover bid rendered the statute an unconstitutional violation of the commerce clause.9 The court therefore enjoined
the Michigan Director from enforcing the Michigan Act against
Martin-Marietta.' °°
Several post-Mite cases have not limited analysis of a state takeover
statute to whether the statute impermissibly burdens interstate commerce
but have followed the Mite plurality's lead and examined the constitutionality of the state statute under the supremacy clause. 01 For example,
in National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp.,'°' the Eighth Circuit held that
the Missouri Takeover Bid Disclosure Act (Missouri Act)' 3 violated both
the commerce clause and the supremacy clause.' °' National City Lines,
after announcing a cash tender offer for all outstanding shares of LLC
Corporation, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Missouri seeking to invalidate several provisions of the Missouri
Act.'0 5 The district court ruled that the Williams Act preempted the
Missouri statute.' 0 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit noted the recent Mite
decision and with little analysis held that the Missouri Act violated the
commerce clause because the burdens that the Missouri Act imposed on
interstate commerce were essentially the same as the burdens the Illinois
Act imposed on interstate commerce." The NationalCity Lines court then
examined at length whether the Williams Act preempted the Missouri
08
Act.'
9 Id.; see supra note 87 (although Oklahoma takeover statute may apply only to tender
offer transactions with local shareholder, Oklahoma Act impermissibly burdens interstate
commerce).
[1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,822, at 94,221.
101 See National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1128-33 (8th Cir. 1982)
(Missouri takeover statute violates supremacy clause); Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Connolly,
98,776, at 93,944-47 (st Cir. 1982)
[1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCHI
(Massachusetts takeover statute's sanction for violating Massachusetts takeover statute
is valid state regulation under supremacy clause); Bendix Corp. v. Martin-Marietta Corp.,
[1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,821, at 94,212 (D. Md. 1982) (Maryland
takeover statute violates supremacy clause).
:02 687 F2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982).
," Mo. ANN. STAT. S 409.500 to .565 (Vernon 1979).
154

687 F.2d at 1128-33.

Id. at 1124. National City Lines sought to invalidate the Missouri Act's precommencement notice requirement, hearing provision, disclosure requirements, and substantive requirements. See id.; Mo. ANN. STAT. %409.510,409.515.1 to .2 (Vernon 1979). LLC Corp.
and the Missouri commissioner of securities conceded that the Missouri Act's precommencement notice requirement conflicted with SEC rule 14d-2(b) and that therefore
the pre-commencement notice requirement violated the commerce clause, 687 F.2d at 1131;
see 17 C.F.R. S 240.14d-2(b) (1982) (tender offer must commence within five days of offer's
announcement); see also infranotes 125-35 and accompanying text (SEC rule 14d-2(b) preempts
state pre-commencement notice requirements).
105

1" 687 F.2d at 1125.

10 Id. at 1128; see supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (burdens Illinois Act imposed on interstate commerce).
1 8 687 F.2d at 1129-33.
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Unlike the Illinois Act's hearing provision, under which the Secretary
of State could stop inequitous tender offers, the hearing provision of the
Missouri Act did not authorize a state official to determine the merits
of takeover bids." Instead the Missouri Act authorized the Missouri Commissioner to order a hearing only to determine whether an offeror had
complied with the Missouri Act's disclosure requirements.110 Although the
National City Lines court acknowledged a qualitative difference between
the hearing provision of the Missouri Act and the hearing provision of
the Illinois Act, the court held that the differences between the two
statutes were insufficient to render the Missouri statute constitutional."'
The court noted that the Missouri Act disrupted the Williams Act's
regulatory neutrality by permitting the Missouri Commissioner to delay
a tender offer until the Commissioner concluded a hearing on whether
the offeror would comply adequately with the Missouri Act's disclosure
requirements."' The court concluded that the Williams Act preempts any
state statute that delays the commencement or consummation of a tender
offer.13
The National City Lines court also extended the Mite plurality's
preemption holding to state disclosure requirements and timing restrictions that differ significantly from the Williams Act."" First, the court
held that the Missouri Act's disclosure requirements violated the
supremacy clause."' The Missouri statute required a tender offeror to
disclose substantially more information than the Williams Act required
an offeror to disclose.1 6 The court reasoned that excessive disclosure may
confuse shareholders by obscuring in a statement full of irrelevant facts
the information necessary for an informed investment decision. 117 Alternatively, the court noted that Congress had delegated to the SEC the
task of determining the disclosure requirements necessary to.carry out
11 Compare Mo.ANN.STAT. § 409.515.1(2V
(ernon 1979) (offer may not proceed if Missouri
commissioner of securities orders hearing to determine whether offeror intends to make
fair, full and objective disclosures) with ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1211/z, S 137.57(A), (E) (SmithHurd Supp. 1982-1983) (Illinois Secretary of State may order hearing to determine whether
offer is equitable).
110See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 409.515.1(2) (Vernon 1979).
121687 F.2d at 1131.
" Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 59-60 (delay upsets Williams Act's regulatory
neutrality).
113 687 F.2d at 1131. The NationalCity Lines court stated that delays discourage tender
offerors from completing takeover bids. Id.
' See 687 F.2d at 1131-33 (Missouri Act's disclosure requirements and substantive provisions violate supremacy clause); Mo. ANN. STAT. SS 409.510,409.515 (Vernon 1979) (disclosure
and substantive requirements).
" 687 F.2d at 1132; see Mo. ANN. STAT. S409.515 (Vernon 1979) (disclosure requirements).
116See Mo. ANN. STAT. S 409.515 (Vernon 1979) (disclosure requirements); cf. supra note
11 (Williams Act's disclosure requirements).
1 687 F2d at 1131; see Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1280 (5th
Cir. 1978) (too much information may confuse investors), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 US. 173 (1979).
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the Williams Act's objective of enabling shareholders to evaluate tender
offers intelligently.118 The National City Lines court concluded that the
Missouri statute's disclosure requirements violated the supremacy clause
by directly conflicting with the congressional determination of appropriate
disclosure requirements and by frustrating the Williams Act's objective
of enabling investors to make informed investment decisions.'
Second, the Missouri statute established time periods for withdrawal
and pro rata purchasing rights that differed significantly from the time
periods the Williams Act established.2" The National City Lines court
noted that an offeror's compliance with both the Williams Act and the
Missouri statute was impossible.' Furthermore, the court stated that compliance with the Missouri Act's substantive requirements provided incumbent management with advantages that would disrupt the regulatory
neutrality that Congress established to ensure the proper operation of
the market approach to investor protection."2 The National City Lines
court concluded that the Williams Act preempted the Missouri statute's
1
withdrawal and pro rata purchasing provisions."
The NationalCity Lines decision and the Mite plurality's preemption
opinion indicate that the regulatory scheme Congress enacted to accomplish the Williams Act's objective of investor protection limits the
scope of state takeover legislation that differs from the Williams Act."
The SEC has further limited the scope of state tender offer regulations
by enacting SEC rule 14d-2(b)"' which restricts the effectiveness of state
1' 687 F.2d at 1132; see 15 U.S.C. S 78n(d)(1) (1976) (tender offeror must disclose information required by SEC); see also supra note 11 (disclosures required by SEC).
11 687 F.2d at 1131-32; see supra note 16 (Congress intended to protect investors by
providing investors with information necessary to informed investment decision).
1 Compare Mo. ANN. STAT. S 409.510(3) (Vernon 1979) (shareholder may withdraw
tendered shares any time within 21 days of offer's commencement); id. S 409.510(4) (offeror
must purchase pro rata shares tendered during entire period of offer if number of tendered
shares exceeds number of shares sought); and id. S 409.510(2) (if offeror amends offer for
any reason, deposit period must be extended at least 21 days from amendment date) with
15 U.S.C. S 78n(d)(6) (1976) (if number of shares tendered in first 10 days of offer exceed
number of shares offeror intends to acquire, offer must purchase tendered shares pro rata);
17 C.F.R. S 240.14d-7(a)(1) (1982) (shareholder may withdraw tendered shares anytime within
fifteen days of offer's commencement); and id. § 240.14e-l(b) (if offeror amends offer to increase offering price, offer extended ten days). See supranote 13 (pro rata purchasing rights
and withdrawal rights).
121

687 F.2d at 1132.

Id. at 1133; see supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text (Congress adopted market
approach to investor protection by establishing scheme of regulatory neutrality).
12 687 F.2d at 1132; see Dart Indus., v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1, 13 (S. D. Ind. 1978)
(Williams Act preempts substantive provisions of Delaware takeover statute that regulate
tender offers differently than Williams Act).
12 See supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text (Williams Act preempts state takeover
statutes that disrupt Williams Act's regulatory scheme); supra notes 114-23 and accompanying text (Williams Act preempts state takeover statutes that regulate tender offers differently than Williams Act).
1
17 C.F.R. S 240.14d-2(b) (1982).
1
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pre-commencement notice requirements.12 SEC rule 14d-2(b) requires that
a tender offer commence within five days of an offer's announcement.2"
State pre-commencement notice requirements, however, generally require
announcement of a tender offer twenty days before the offer commences."
In Canadian Pacific Enterprises, Inc. v. Krause,"9 the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio held that SEC rule 14d-2(b)
preempted the Ohio takeover statute's twenty day pre-commencement
notice requirement."' Canadian Pacific had announced a tender offer for
all outstanding shares of Hobart Corporation."2 ' Confronted with the im-

possibility of complying with both the SEC rule and the Ohio statute, Canadian Pacific filed suit to enjoin the Ohio Commissioner of Securities from
enforcing the Ohio statute.' The CanadianPacificcourt noted that SEC
rule 14d-2(b) was a valid regulatory provision promulgated pursuant to
the Williams Act.'" The court stated that the Ohio statute directly conflicted with SEC rule 14d-2(b) because the time frames contradicted each
other." The CanadianPacifw court concluded that the Ohio statute's con12 See id. (tender offeror must commence or withdraw offer within 5 days of offers
announcement); see also Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181, 191 (3rd Cir. 1980) (reasonable
likelyhood that SEC rule 14d-2(b) preempts New Jersey takeover statute's 20 day precommencement provision); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-16384 (Nov. 29,
1979), reprinted in [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,373, at 82,584
[hereinafter cited as SEC Release No. 34-16384] (SEC rule 14d-2(b) preempts state takeover
statutes that postpone commencement of offer until end of pre-commencement waiting period
or that postpone commencement until completion of hearing); supra note 23 (precommencement notice and hearing provisions).
27 17 C.F.R. 5 240.14d-2(b) (1982). SEC rule 14d-2(a) (5) provides that a tender offer commences when the offeror first publishes or otherwise disseminates the offer's terms to the
target corporation's shareholders. Id. S 240.14d-2(a) (5). SEC rule 14d-2(b) provides that an
offeror's press release, newspaper advertisement or public statement which discloses the
identity of the offeror, the identity of the target company, the amount and class of securities
sought, and the offered price commences a tender offer under SEC rule 14d-2(b). Id. S
240.14d-2(b); see id. S 240.14d-2(c) (informational the SEC requires an offeror to disclose to
commence tender offer). Under SEC rule 14d-2(b) (1), however, an offeror has 5 days to
withdraw an offer. Id. S 240.14d-2(b) (1). Furthermore, if an offeror files a schedule 14D-1
disclosure statement within five days of the offer's publication, the offer commences on
the date of the schedule 14D-1 statement's filing. Id. S 240.14d-2(b) (2); see supra note 13
(disclosure requirements of schedule 14D-1 statement). See generally Note, The Validity of
State Tender Offer Statutes:SEC Rule 14d-2(b) and Post-Kidweil FederalDecisions, 38 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1025 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Validity of State Tender Offer Statutes].
" See supra note 23 (state pre-commencement notice requirements); but see infra note
135 (state takeover statutes that have been amended to comply with SEC rule 14d-2(b)).
' 506 F. Supp. 1192 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
12 Id. at 1197, See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. S 1707.041 (Baldwin 1982) (twenty day precommencement notice requirement).
121
1"

506 F. Supp. at 1193.
Id. at 1194.

'" Id. at 1203. The CanadianPacificcourt held that SEC rule 14d-2(b) was a valid exercise of the SEt's rulemaking authority because the rule does not exceed the SEC's statutory
authority and because the rule was not arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 1198-203.
506 F. Supp. at 1197. Compare 17 C.F.R. S240.14d-2(b) (tender offers commence within
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flict with SEC rule 14d-2(b) rendered the statute's pre-commencement filing requirement unconstitutional under the supremacy clause.'
Although the majority of post-Mite cases and SEC rule 14d-2(b) limit
the permissible scope of state takeover statutes, one post-Mite court has
affirmed the constitutionality of a state takeover statute."H In Agency RentA-Car, Inc. v. Connolly,'31 the First Circuit held that the Williams Act
did not preempt the Massachusetts takeover statute's sanctions
provision.138 The Massachusetts statute regulated creeping tender offers
by prohibiting a shareholder that owns at least five percent of a
Massachusetts corporation and intends to acquire control of the corporation from making a tender offer if the offeror purchased shares of the
corporation in the preceeding year and failed to disclose any intentions
of acquiring control of the corporation." 9 Agency Rent-A-Car initiated a
tender offer to acquire control of Spencer Companies. " The Massachusetts
Securities Division, however, ordered Agency to discontinue the tender
5 days of offer's announcement) with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. S 1707.041 (Baldwin 1982) (offeror
must wait 20 days after disclosure before commencing takeover bid).
135 506 F. Supp. at 1197. An advance announcement that an offeror intends to make
a tender offer for a corporation's securities without specifying the amount of securities
the offeror will purchase or the price the offeror will pay does not commence a tender
offer under SEC rule 14d-2(b). 17 C.F.R. S 240.14d-2(d) (1982). SEC rule 14d-2(b), therefore,
does not preempt state pre-commencement notice provisions that limit the information an
offeror must disclose to shareholders to the information specified in SEC Rule 14d-2(d).
See NEV. REV. STAT. S 78.3771 (1981) (offeror must file twenty days before commencement of
offerjbuLneed not specify amount of securities sought or offered price); see also Validity
of State Tender Offer Statutes,supra note 127, at 1037-38 (states can bring pre-commencement
notice requirements into compliance with SEC rule 14d-2(b)). Several state legislatures have
eliminated the state's pre-commencement notice requirements but have conditioned an offeror's purchase of tendered shares upon the completion of the state's review process. See,
e.g., IND. CODE ANN. S 23-2-3.1-7(a), 23-2-3.1-8 (Burns Supp. 1981) (offeror may not purchase
shares within first 20 days after offer commences); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW S 1602, McKinney
Supp. 1982-1983) (offeror must file registration statement with New York Attorney General
on date of offer's commencement); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW S 1604 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983)
(New York Attorney General may order hearing within 15 days after offer's commencement); Pennsylvania Securities Commission, Interpretive Opinion, May 9, 1981, reprinted
in 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 48,681, at 43,651 (offer is not subject to waiting period if offer
conditioned on registration becoming effective and conditioned on offeror making no purchases of tendered securities prior to effective date of registration); see also Sargent, supra
note 47, at 708-12 (state statutes that comply with SEC Rule 14d-2(b)).
136 See Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Connolly, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,776, at 93,947 (ist Cir. 1982) (Massachusetts takeover statute's sanctions provision for violating statute does not violate supremacy clause); see also supra note 28 (cases
holding that state takeover statute does not violate commerce clause).
137[1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,776, at 93,939 (1st Cir. 1982).
138Id. at 93,947; see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110C, § 3 (West Supp. 1982-1983) (sanction provision for violating Massachusetts takeover statute).
13 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110C, S 3 (West Supp. 1982-1983); cf. supranote 86 (provisions of Kentucky takeover statute, similar to provisions of Massachusetts takeover statute,
held to violate supremacy clause).
10 [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,776, at 93,940.
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offer because Agency had purchased Spencer securities in the year
preceeding the takeover bid without disclosing an intent to gain control
of Spencer."' Subsequently, Agency filed suit to enjoin the Massachusetts
Securities Division from enforcing the order stopping the takeover bid.
The Agency Rent-A-Car court noted that although the Massachusetts
statute's sanction for violating the statutes disclosure requirement delayed
tender offers, the delay did not tip the regulatory balance in favor of incumbent management, but instead, ensured compliance with the statute's
provisions."' The court distinguished the Mite plurality's holding that delay
conflicted with the Williams Act by noting that an offeror could not avoid
the delays the Illinois Act imposed on tender offers because the delays
were "built-in" to the timing requirements of tender offers subject to the
Illinois Act. 4' The Agency Rent-A-Car court, however, stated that an offeror could avoid the delay caused by the Massachusetts takeover statute
by complying with the disclosure requirements of the statute." The court
concluded that any conflict between the Massachusetts statute's sanction
provision and the Williams Act was insufficient to justify preemption."'
The court's holding, therefore, is limited to state statutes that penalize
offerors for violating the provisions of the state's takeover statute. 7 The
Agency Rent-A-Cqr court did not address the constitutionality of the
Massachusetts statute's disclosure requirements." 8 Furthermore, the
Agency Rent-A-Car court remanded the case to the district court for a
determination of the constitutionality of the Massachusetts statute in light
of the Supreme Court's commerce clause ruling in Mite."' The post-Mite
commerce clause decisions indicate that the Massachusetts statute impermissibly burdens interstate commerce because the Massachusetts
statute halts interstate securities transactions. 5 '
The post-Mite cases concerning the constitutionality of state takeover
statutes demonstrate the extent that Mite restricts the effectiveness of
state takeover laws.' The Supreme Court dramatically restricted the
reach of state takeover statutes by ruling that the only legitimate state
interest in regulating takeover bids was to protect the interests of resiId.
Id.
3 Id. at 93,946-47.
Id. at 93,947.

141
142

1

Id. at 93,947.

Id.
" See supra text accompanying note 138-39 (Williams Act does not preempt sanction
'

provision).
[1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.(CCH) 98,776, at 93,947.
Id. at 93,948; see supra notes 36-50 and accompanying text (Mite Court's commerce
clause holding).
I' See supra note 86 (Supreme Court of Kentucky held that Kentucky statute similar
to Massachusetts takeover statute impermissibly burdens interstate commerce).
"I1See infra text accompanying notes 152-71 (Miteand post-Mite decisions have restricted
permissible scope of state takeover legislation).
14
14
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dent shareholders. 2 To satisfy the requirements of Mite, therefore, a
state's takeover statute must directly and beneficially regulate the interests of resident shareholders without imposing substantial burdens on
interstate commerce." Furthermore, the benefits a state takeover statute
provides local investors must be real and substantial."M The post-Mite cases
demonstrate the difficulty states will have in demonstrating that the state's
takeover statute provides real and substantial benefits to local investors."'
As the Fourth Circuit noted in Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, the benefits of
state legislation that duplicates the investor protection provisions of the
Williams Act are too uncertain to justify the burdens a state takeover
statute imposes on interstate commerce."' Additionally, the Mite Court
suggested that a state takeover statute that attempts to provide local
shareholders with more protection than the Williams Act provides, actually might harm investors by tipping the regulatory balance of the
Williams Act toward management thereby increasing the risk that management would defeat a tender offer."7 Consequently the benefits attributable
to state takeover statutes are few because of the proposed benefits'
speculative nature when the state law is either similar to or different
than the investor protection provisions of the Williams Act."8
Even state laws providing real and substantial benefits to local investors are constitutionally suspect because of the substantial burden complying with numerous local statutes imposes on nation-wide tender offers." 9
State legislatures could lessen the offeror's burden of complying with
numerous states' regulations by restricting the scope of state statutes
to include only target corporations with a high percentage of resident
shareholders."' The fact that the majority of tender offers are for diversely
held corporations, however, limits the usefulness of state takeover statutes
that base jurisdiction on a high percentage of local shareholders.'"' The
152See Edgar v. Mite Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629, 2642 (1982) (state has no interest in protecting nonresident shareholders).
" See supra note 36 (Pike v. Bruce Church test).
"' See supra text accompanying notes 44-45 (benefits of Illinois statute to local
shareholders too speculative to render Illinois takeover statute constitutional).
"' See supra text accompanying notes 41 (state takeover statutes provide few benefits
to local investors).
15 See supra text accompanying note 83 (benefits of Virginia takeover statute's creeping tender offer provisions too uncertain to render Virginia statute constitutional).
"'.See Edgar v. Mite Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629, 2642 (1982) (increased risk that tender
offer might fail outweighs probable benefits of delays); see also supra note 19 (delay increases management's chances of defeating takeover bids).
"' See supra text accompanying notes 44-45 (benefits of Illinois statute to local
shareholders too speculative to render Illinois takeover statute constitutional).
See Edgar v. Mite Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629, 2641 (1982) (multiple state regulation of
takeovers would stifle takeover bids).
"6 See id. at 2642 (protecting local investors is legitimate state interest).
...See Austin, Tender Offer Update: 1978-1979, 15 Mergers & Acquisitions, Summer
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very nature of tender offers as interstate transactions, therefore, precludes
states from effectively regulating takeover bids without imposing undue
burdens on interstate commerce.162 The decision of the Sixth Circuit in
Martin-MariettaCorp. v. Bendix Corp. illustrates the extent that seemingly local takeover legislation can burden impermissibly interstate
securities transactions.1" The Martin-Mariettadecision demonstrates that
even a state takeover statute which applies only to the part of a tender
offer that an offeror directs to local shareholders imposes substantial
burdens on interstate commerce by affecting the success of nation-wide
tender offers that require the shares of local investors for success.' In
light of the speculative benefits of state takeover statutes and the substantial burdens that even the most locally oriented statute imposes on interstate securities transactions, the ability of any effective state takeover
statute to withstand commerce clause analysis is doubtful. 16 5
The post-Mite cases that have examined whether a state takeover
statute violates the supremacy clause have imposed further restraints on
the methods state legislatures may adopt to regulate tender offers.'66 The
Mite plurality's opinion and the NationalCity Lines decision indicate that
the Williams Act preempts state statutes that potentially delay the commencement or consumation of a tender offer.'67 Additionally, the National
City Lines case illustrates the propensity of courts to hold that the
Williams Act preempts state laws that regulate takeovers differently than
the Williams Act.'68 SEC rule 14d-2(d)'s preemption of pre-commencement
notice requirements and the rulings of the post-Mite cases limit the scope
of permissible state regulation of tender offers to regulations similar to
the provisions of the Williams Act. 6 ' The benefits to local shareholders
of state regulations similar to the provisions of the Williams Act, however,
are speculative and will not render a state takeover statute constitutional

1928, at 24-32 (listing of corporations subjected to tender offers between 1976-1979).
182See Edgar v. Mite Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629, 2642 (1982) (Illinois statute effects nationwide tender offers).
18 See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text (state takeover statutes that regulate
only transactions between offeror and local investors burden interstate commerce).
"'

Id.

Id.; supra text accompanying notes 155-58 (state takeover statutes benefit to local
investors is speculative).
16 See supra note 101 (post-Mite cases examining the constitutionality of state statutes
under the supremacy clause).
18 See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text (Williams Act preempts state statutes
that provide management with any undue advantage; supranotes 55-65 and accompanying
text (Williams Act preempts state statutes that disrupt Williams Act's regulatory neutrality).
See supra notes 114-23 and accompanying text (Williams Act preempts state takeover
statutes that regulate tender offers differently than Williams Act).
189 See id.; supra notes 125-35 and accompanying text (SEC rule 14d-2(b) preempts conflicting state provisions).
'
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under the commerce clause." The dual threat of the supremacy clause
and the commerce clause, therefore, precludes the states from effectively
17
regulating takeover bids. '
WILLIAM G. CONWAY

170
7

See supra text accompanying notes 154-55 (benefits must be real and substantial).
See supra text accompanying notes 151-70 (state takeover statutes are

unconstitutional).

